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I. Introduction
The recent trial decision of Justice Vickers of the British Columbia Supreme Court in
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 1 has reawakened previously quiescent issues
concerning the implications of Aboriginal title claims in Canada for privately held
property within potential claim areas. Previous Canadian judicial decisions have tended
to downplay any suggestion that Aboriginal title claims would affect privately held land, 2
preferring to consider resolutions, if it came to a judicial decision in favour of Aboriginal
title, that would be made through restitution of Crown lands along with monetary
compensation. 3 However, as I develop further in Part II, this recent judgment has
reawakened uncertainty on this point.
In this paper, I will pursue a narrow claim that we should avoid an interpretation of
Aboriginal title that threatens privately held lands. In making this narrow argument, I
will assume that there are valid moral justifications for the institution of private property,
although my argument will operate agnostically as between different specific
justifications. 4 I will, however, engage more specifically with one particular moral
account, this being Jeremy Waldron’s arguments on supersession of historic injustice. In
Part III, I set out Waldron’s basic argument and begin to engage with some of its limits in
abstract terms, posing challenges to his account. In Part IV, I consider, however, whether
Waldron’s argument could be used to support exactly the sort of balancing test at which
Justice Vickers’s judgment hints. In Part V, I challenge that claim and argue instead that
Waldron’s argument helps to illuminate relevant distinctions but that an awareness of
these distinctions also ultimately pushes us away from the application of Aboriginal title
claims directly against privately held property. In the process of making the argument on
the narrow point at issue, of course, I thus implicitly (and perhaps controversially) seek to
1

For discussion of the case, see Dwight G. Newman & Danielle Schweitzer, “Between
Reconciliation and the Rule(s) of Law: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia” (2008) U.B.C. L. Rev.
2
3
4

For some such justifications, see:
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salvage something from Waldron’s supersession thesis that may have bearing in other
circumstances.

II. The Doctrine of Aboriginal Title and Its Application
The doctrine of Aboriginal title is a specific doctrine within Canadian law 5 recognizing
an Aboriginal right to land where there was exclusive occupation of particular lands by
an Aboriginal community prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty over these lands
and where there is some form of ongoing, substantial relation between the Aboriginal
community and those lands. 6
Past case law has avoided suggestions that Aboriginal title would affect private land
owners. Although the legal technique has not followed the simple approach of
McEachern C.J. in the trial court decision in Delgamuukw (which the Supreme Court of
Canada interpreted early in its judgment in that case as being that any fee simple grant to
a third party would give rise to implied extinguishment 7 before the Court did not mention
the matter again), the case law has been almost as adamant. In Skeetchestn Indian Band
v. British Columbia (Registrar of Land Titles), 8 the British Columbia Court of Appeal
affirmed a decision that a certificate of pending litigation could not be registered under
the Land Title Act with respect to upcoming Aboriginal title litigation. In The Chippewas
of Sarnia Band case, the main conclusion of the Ontario Court of Appeal on interactions
of private property and Aboriginal title claims was that it would support an exercise of
discretion not to grant a title remedy in the case of land now privately owned by innocent
third party purchasers. 9 The same impulse that innocent third parties should not be
affected would seem present, as well in the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent
determination in the duty to consult context that claims based on the duty to consult apply
exclusively against the Crown and cannot be invoked against private companies. 10
Given this background, one could have anticipated another reasonably clear decision that
Aboriginal title does not affect private land ownership. Justice Vickers, by contrast, is
5
6
7

The doctrine, of course, is not unique to Canadian law, but I present the Canadian version here.
SOURCES FOR THIS STATEMENT OF THE TEST
para. 23 of Delg

8
9

para 272 (noting the point in general terms) and para. 275 (stating that “[t]he interests of innocent third
parties who have relied upon the apparent validity of the Cameron patent must prevail to the extent that the
Chippewas assert a remedy that either directly or by necessary implication would set aside the Cameron
patent. In so holding, we repeat here that we do not intend to preclude or limit the right of the Chippewas to
proceed with their claim for damages against the Crowns.”) A delay by the Chippewas in bringing their
claim also factored in the Court’s analysis, although the reasoning on the rights of innocent private
landholders would appear to have been determinative in any event.
10
As stated in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73,
at para. 53, “The Crown alone remains legally responsible for the consequences of its actions and
interactions with third parties, that affect Aboriginal interests”. The Court at ibid., para. 56 would
implicitly have restricted private parties’ duties to Aboriginal communities to traditional tort and contract
actions.
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anything but clear. Indeed, there are different readings on just what Justice Vickers says
on this point, heightening the complex implications of the judgment. Some law firms
have rushed to try to inform clients of the judgment’s implications for private land
ownership, 11 but they have come to seemingly differing interpretations of its
implications. For example, Lawson Lundell pointed out that “the decision does not
suggest that third parties who have received tenures from the provincial government in
good faith and who have conducted themselves in accordance with those tenures are in
any way liable to the Tsilhqot’in Nation, even if their activities have affected the
Tsilhqot’in Nation’s aboriginal rights or title.” 12 Borden Ladner Gervais, by contrast,
concluded that the “opinion on the application of provincial laws raises questions about
the effect of underlying Aboriginal title on all third party rights derived from provincial
authority, such as fee simple titles, licences and tenures.” 13 Blakes presented what would
seem to be an intermediate view that “the judge did note that the creation of private
interests in the Claim Area, such as by fee simple grant from the Province, has not and
cannot extinguish Tsilhqot’in rights, including aboriginal title. The Court essentially left
it up to the parties to reconcile the competing interests of the Tsilhqot’in, private parties
and governments within the Claim Area.” 14
In terms of what he actually says, consistently with the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Delgamuukw, 15 Justice Vickers considers that only the federal government
has jurisdiction within the Canadian division of powers to legislate with respect to lands
affected by Aboriginal title. 16 He concludes, then, that Aboriginal title has not been
extinguished by provincial grants of land in fee simple or of any other interests in land. 17
The implication is that there may be ongoing Aboriginal title interests in land previously
thought to be held by private owners. 18
Indeed, Justice Vickers is explicit in both generating a degree of uncertainty on these
considerations and attempting to send some calming words about them. In a passage that
raises perhaps as many questions as it answers, he writes:
What is not clear from the jurisprudence are the consequences of underlying
Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, on the various private interests that
exist in the Claim Area. While they have not extinguished the rights of the
Tsilhqot’in people, their existence may have some impact on the application or
exercise of those Aboriginal rights. This conclusion is consistent with the view of
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 56 (Ont.C.A). Reconciliation of competing interests
will be dependant on a variety of factors, including the nature of the interests, the
circumstances surrounding the transfer of the interests, the length of the tenure,
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

para. 1039
para. 998
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and the existing land use. Such a task has not been assigned to this Court by the
issues raised in the pleadings. 19
Although the task was, in Justice Vickers’s own words, “not assigned to this Court”, he
thus offers a sort of balancing test for assessments of the rival claims of an Aboriginal
community asserting a title claim and private land owners. The decision to hint at the
possibility of such a test may have arisen from a concern as to the impact on
reconciliation of a simple pronouncement of possible risks to private property.
The reactions to Justice Vickers’s conclusions on private property are one uncertain
element as the Tsilhqot’in Nation case moves forward. At this stage, one other court has
cited to it as raising uncertainties around conclusions to be drawn concerning
relationships between Aboriginal title and private property. 20 What is most surprising,
perhaps, is what little public reaction it has faced to date, having attracted limited media
comment. 21 In a forthcoming case comment, my co-author and I compare this muted
reaction to the much more boisterous reactions experienced when similar issues arose in
Australia. 22
Perhaps the reaction has been muted because it is not clear, as yet, what the case means.
I say this in a strict doctrinal sense in that the judgment itself ends up declining to
recognize the Aboriginal title claim at issue, or even to make an order, but instead offers
what it calls an “opinion” that Justice Vickers hopes can guide further negotiations rather
than have the matter go back for further trial on unresolved matters. 23 It is not clear
whether that is what will happen or not. As the different sides commenced onto attempts
at negotiation, they also all filed for leave to appeal the judgment, and it may work its
way up the court system. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the judgment opens the
prospect of Aboriginal title claims affecting private property marks a significant
departure from the more reassuring tones of past jurisprudence and properly opens
discussion on whether Aboriginal title should in fact have that implication. Even Kent
McNeil, a prominent academic advocate of Aboriginal rights claims, has retreated from
this implication to an extent, and although welcoming many dimensions of the judgment,
he is quick to suggest that in fact individual private property holders should not face the
effects of Aboriginal title claims but that all of society should in fact offer significant
compensation to Aboriginal communities with Aboriginal title claims. 24 The suggestion
that individual property owners should not have their titles overturned may seem intuitive
in some respects, but further analyzing the issues calls for a deeper foray into relevant
theory. To enter into the discussion, I turn to a prominent, although contested, argument
offered by Jeremy Waldron.

19
20

21
22
23
24

paras. 999-1000.
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III. Waldron’s Supersession Thesis
In a series of articles, 25 Jeremy Waldron has stated and restated a thesis that historic
injustices may in some cases have become superseded by changes in factual
circumstances such that it is no longer morally obligatory, and perhaps even morally
impermissible, to correct them. Within the articles in which he makes this argument, he
alludes as well to other arguments against reparations for historic injustice, notably an
argument related to the indeterminacy of what would have happened but for an historic
injustice given the complex implications of free will. 26 Those arguments are
interesting—if problematic, for taken to the limits of the principle, it would become
impossible to assess damages for any ordinary torts case, for instance, of loss of future
income—but they are not my focus here. I wish specifically to draw on, engage with and
challenge, but ultimately show the properly limited application of Waldron’s
supersession thesis.
The thesis begins from a narrow, seemingly innocuous statement: “If the requirements of
justice are sensitive to circumstances such as the size of the population or the incidence
of scarcity, then there is no guarantee that those requirements (and the rights that they
constitute) will remain constant in relation to a given resource or piece of land as the
decades and generations go by.” 27 Taking the point more abstractly, Waldron reasons to
another conclusion that might seem similarly saccharine: “it seems possible that an act
which counted as an injustice when it was committed in circumstances C1 may be
transformed, so far as its ongoing effect is concerned, into a just situation if
circumstances change in the meantime from C1 to C2. When this happens, I shall say
that the injustice has been superseded.” 28
Waldron then offers what he considers a specific example of such a supersession of
historic injustice. He asks us to imagine a situation of plenty in which group Q seizes a
waterhole from group P out of sheer greed and insists on sharing it, without sharing
anything with P. Q’s taking of the waterhole is a clear injustice. However, if
circumstances later change, such that this waterhole becomes the only waterhole that is
not dry, Q’s ongoing sharing of the waterhole will cease to be unjust, the injustice having
been superseded by circumstances. 29
And, here comes the significant conclusion. Waldron admits that this argument
obviously does not mean that every unjust taking of land has had its injustice
25

Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession”, in G. Oddie & R. Perrett,
eds., Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992); Jeremy
Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) 103 Ethics 4; ADD OTHER CITES
26
Waldron 1992 pp 8-11; Waldron 2002 pp 144-146
27
1992 p 16
28
1992 p 24; Waldron 2002 p 155
29
1992 pp 24-25; Waldron 2002 pp 151-52
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superseded. 30 But he also makes the explicit assertion that the argument might imply the
supersession of historic injustices against indigenous peoples in North America and
Australasia, arguing that since white settlement “[t]he population has increased manifold,
and most of the descendants of the colonists, unlike their ancestors have nowhere else to
go. We cannot be sure that these changes in circumstances supersede the injustice of
their continued possession of aboriginal lands, but it would not be surprising if they did.
The facts that have changed are exactly the sort of facts one would expect to make a
difference to the justice of a set of entitlements over resources.” 31
One frustrating element of Waldron’s account is that it is offered essentially, and
repeatedly, as a defensive account, setting up a hurdle that advocates of reparations for
historic injustices or, more specifically, 32 advocates for Aboriginal land rights claims, are
tasked with overcoming. Waldron, in other words, does not develop a constructive case.
He does not flesh out when his argument does or does not challenge a particular claim.
He sets it out only as a vague obstacle, perhaps leaving us in a genuinely frustrating
position when we have begun with a vague judicial decision that might arguably now be
met by vague objections.
Nonetheless, Waldron’s argument has taken on a certain degree of prominence in related
debates, with many citing to it to at least some extent. 33 Indeed, some have become
actually enraged by it to the point that they dismiss it immediately, without analysis, as a
racist attempt to justify illegitimate dispossessions of indigenous communities. So, for
instance, Dale Turner, in a generally carefully reasoned argument, ends up challenging
Waldron’s supersession thesis in fairly emotive terms. 34 That some would react against
Waldron’s argument more emotively might be understandable in some respects, but
emotional reactions seldom get us far in convincing those who hold different points of
view. It is important, rather, to engage carefully with Waldron’s argument, to challenge
it where it needs to be challenged, and to show its limits, or one ultimately surrenders to
its force amongst those who will cite it without much analysis either, thus giving it a
force that it arguably does not deserve. 35
Waldron’s thesis makes a limited claim, that there may be some circumstances in which
an injustice becomes superseded by circumstances. Waldron is ready to interpret this as
giving rise to an internal limit on the property rights held by an original possessor of land
or resources, 36 thus interpreting, for instance, the original waterhole owner’s claim as
inherently limited relative to circumstances in which enforcing this claim becomes
unjust. 37 However, his waterhole examples present dramatic circumstances of
humanitarian need. That justice might permit overriding rights in certain circumstances
of dramatic humanitarian need does not necessarily imply an internal limit on the rights
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

1992 p 26l; Waldron 2002 p 156
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so much as what one might equally take to be a humanitarian exception that may arise in
the context of humanitarian emergencies but not as a general rights limitation. 38
Waldron’s waterhole examples do not necessarily prove any more than this more
moderate claim. And, indeed, this limited conclusion is not inconsistent with his vaguely
stated supersession thesis: “an act which counted as an injustice when it was committed
in circumstances C1 may be transformed, so far as its ongoing effect is concerned, into a
just situation if circumstances change in the meantime from C1 to C2. When this
happens, I shall say that the injustice has been superseded.” 39
The question arising is whether injustices are superseded in a wider range of
circumstances. Waldron asserts that they are. But his argument ultimately offers little
more than a weakly-worded, probabilistic assertion about the history of North America
and Australasia that “[t]he facts that have changed are exactly the sort of facts one would
expect to make a difference to the justice of a set of entitlements over resources.” 40
Waldron does not explain exactly how, nor does he offer any genuinely richer argument
on the point, leaving much for others to discuss.
Waldron’s supersession thesis does raise interesting questions, but its force is potentially
limited. What we need to explore further is whether the existence of the possibility of
supersession has any implications for Aboriginal title claims to privately held property.

IV. Waldron’s Thesis as a Balancing Test
Waldron’s argument is precisely that circumstances may affect the justice of seeking to
undo a historic injustice. One natural implication of it, then, might seem to be that it is
appropriate to have regard to the circumstances in determining the appropriate resolution
for a particular historic injustice, including for the illegitimate taking of Aboriginal lands
that might be corrected through the doctrine of Aboriginal title. On this line of argument,
then, Justice Vickers’s balancing test might well seem to flow naturally.
Justice Vickers, although not developing it further, states that “[r]econciliation of
competing interests will be dependant on a variety of factors, including the nature of the
interests, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the interests, the length of the
tenure, and the existing land use.” 41 The multifactorial analysis that would flow from
this statement, and that we may see as a sort of balancing test, is one that seems to fit
with what might matter in respect of the justice of seeking to correct a historic injustice in
various situations. We can perhaps see this point most clearly by imagining the extremes
within the various factors Justice Vickers suggests.
In Scenario A, we might imagine the following factors: (1) a particular Aboriginal
community having a particularly strong connection to a specific site – perhaps it was used
38
39
40
41

Cf. Patton 260.
1992 p 24; Waldron 2002 p 155
1992 p 26l; Waldron 2002 p 156
paras. 999-1000.
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extensively as a particularly sacred spiritual site prior to its having been taken by white
settlers; (2) the private property owner having only a limited interest in the land, having
for some reason given back some of the rights in the land to the Crown; (3) the
historically unjust transfer having been accomplished through brutal violence and fraud
in which the private property owner’s predecessors were complicit – or, to put the point
at its strongest, consider even a scenario where the identical private property owner (a
long-standing corporation) was complicit; (4) the unjust taking of the land having been
relatively recent; and (5) the land currently being scarcely used, if at all, other than by the
Aboriginal community itself, which has been permitted to hunt and fish on it.
In Scenario B, we might imagine a different set of factors: (1) the Aboriginal community
having made little use of the land, such that its use has only barely crossed the threshold
even giving rise to an Aboriginal title claim; (2) the private property owner seeing a
particularly strong connection to the land, which has been within the owner’s family for
generations; (3) the original transfer of the land from the Aboriginal community having
been accomplished in error rather than through any deliberate taking and the land having
been transferred between several bona fide purchasers early on, obscuring any error in its
original acquisition; (4) the private property ownership having stretched back over four
hundred years; and (5) the land currently being extensively used in ways particularly
important to the present owner, including parts of it as sacred sites within this owner’s
religious traditions.
There is, of course, little doubting that Scenario A presents a stronger case than Scenario
B for restoration of the land to the Aboriginal community from which it had been taken.
The cumulative difference in these different factors obviously makes a difference, and
these particular circumstances do matter. And, one might add, it would not be at all
unreasonable to conclude that the moral force of the Aboriginal title claim in various
scenarios between A and B, varying on the different factors, would be proportionate (at
least metaphorically speaking) to the variation in the different factors.
In as far as Waldron’s argument tracks these circumstantial differences, then, it would
appear to actually have some truth to it. Indeed, considering something like Scenario B
might face down one of the objections we posed to Waldron’s claims in the previous
section. Scenario B presents something that may not be the most common scenario in
respect of private property holdings on land that would have been subject to an
Aboriginal title claim but that may at least be a possible and even existing scenario. It
presents a more realistic scenario than Waldron’s more dramatic waterhole example. At
the same time, it presents a scenario in which one can see a strong case that it would be
unjust to take the land from the private property owner.
There would, of course, be theories of property that would challenge even the claim of
the private property owner in Scenario B. 42 Yet, to the extent that they do so, they run
counter to significant doctrines of common law property, notably possibilities of

42
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acquisition through prescription, and accordingly have a strong onus to meet. 43 Although
we cannot within one argument dismiss every possibility of such a case being mounted, it
seems at least unlikely that such a case can be successfully argued.
Indeed, there are strong reasons to reject an argument that the private property owner’s
land should be taken in Scenario B. Specifically, each of the strongest arguments for
restoring the land itself to the indigenous community even in these circumstances actually
ends up becoming an argument for the land to remain with the current owner. Although
these arguments obviously vary with different theories of property, 44 we can consider at
least some of the better arguments to see that this is so. Consider, first, an argument that
the indigenous community that seeks the land under the doctrine of Aboriginal title is
morally entitled to that land because recovery of the land is important to the community’s
cultural identity and feeling of wholeness. 45 However, by the very factors that have
varied to give rise to Scenario B, the current owner and that owner’s ancestors have lives
extensively enmeshed with this land, and the land is vital to their identity. Thus, an
argument related to property as identity actually resists the Aboriginal title claim.
Consider, second, an argument that allowing the current ownership to continue works an
injustice to the Aboriginal community specifically by treating that community unequally
in so far as other landowners who had possession of land at the date the land was taken
were recognized as legitimate owners of that land and this community, along with other
communities facing this similar discrimination, is uniquely unequally treated. 46
However, here, the fact will be that those not within the scope of an Aboriginal title
doctrine do not have a claim for restoration of land four hundred years after the fact. So,
the claim as to unequal treatment would have been true at the time of the taking but is no
longer true. Third, let us consider an argument that the courts work an ongoing injustice
against the Aboriginal community if they deny recovery of the land, for they effectively
prefer the imposed Canadian legal system over the law of the Aboriginal community
deprived of the land. 47 This argument might appear most troubling, but ultimately the
court adjudicating an Aboriginal title claim is applying neither the Canadian legal system
nor an Aboriginal legal system but an intersocietal body of law, 48 within which the bulk
of opinion is that considerations of morality may properly figure. 49 If those
considerations independently weigh in favour of the current owner, then to fail to
overturn them is actually to apply properly the intersocietal law. Thus, the claim of the
private property owner in Scenario B appears safe.

43

Where certain legal frameworks, notably certain versions of the Torrens land registration system,
remove acquisition by prescription, they do so in a context where there is clear evidence available to
anyone who seeks it of the legally correct ownership of particular land, something notably not present in
the context of a private property owner who acquires land held by an indigenous community in the distant
past.
44
45
46
47
48
49
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That said, there is perhaps a further distinction that I should properly introduce that might
call into question whether I have applied Waldron’s framework as he would have
intended. Waldron’s argument, in some respects, appears to work well in respect of
moral considerations that affect whether a particular private landowner must give up
certain specific lands in question. However, in his pushing towards some implications of
his argument, Waldron did not couch his factors in terms applicable to these scenarios.
Rather, he referred to broader societal issues and whether the overall size of a population
and the general options available to its members diminished the settler community’s
obligations to the indigenous population for historic injustices. My scenario has not been
an overall societal scenario but a specific scenario related to specific persons and specific
lands.
This objection does not undermine the force of my claims about the moral response to the
different scenarios or the fact that circumstantial variations between Scenario A and
Scenario B affect the relevant moral responsibilities arising. It says, at most, that
Waldron’s more abstract claims about the moral effect of circumstances contained
potential not fully realized in his extremely generalized historical claims.
However, this objection might direct our attention to a further distinction and further
possibility. Thus far, my examples have linked a claim of Aboriginal title to a specific
remedy of the return of the land from its present owner to an Aboriginal community with
a valid Aboriginal title claim. If there are but two binary options, either that of the
present owner retaining the land and the Aboriginal community getting nothing or that of
the present owner returning the land to the Aboriginal community and the present owner
retaining nothing, then in Scenario B there is a clear case for the present owner retaining
the land and in Scenario A a clear case for the Aboriginal community recovering the land.
However, considering the scenarios in a societal context opens other possibilities. In
Scenario B, third party wrongdoers in the past took the Aboriginal community’s land. At
least part of the injustice of allowing an Aboriginal title claim against the private property
owner would consist in imposing on this owner all of the responsibility for something
done by someone else. Separating the claim from the remedy can open different options,
such as that of some broader group paying monetary compensation for the land, either to
the Aboriginal community or to the present owner, the appropriate claim and appropriate
remedy perhaps both to be determined by a complex set of circumstances. I now turn, in
the next section, to the implications of separating the wrong and the remedy, but arguing
instead that this possibility may actually lead to significant moral reasons not to interfere
with current private property holdings.

V. Aboriginal Title, Private Property, and Bright-Line Rules
If the prospect of taking land from an individual property owner whose life is now
enmeshed with that land 50 is what drives the moral force of a number of the
circumstances that figure in Justice Vickers’s test, which I argued in the last section
50

This describes it less agnostically than one could relative to different accounts of property. Those more
attracted to a different account of property are free to read this differently.
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might seem to be an application in some respects of Waldron’s account, then altering the
possible remedies might seem to remove the moral force of those circumstances in
respect of the claim and alter only what remedy properly applies. However, I want to
argue now that this conclusion actually works against the possibility of restoring privately
owned lands to Aboriginal communities. Although the possibility exists of paying
compensation to private landowners whose lands are found subject to Aboriginal title
claims, there are independent reasons to prefer the possibility of forms of compensation
to the Aboriginal communities involved that do not affect the property rights of private
property owners, other than in rare and exceptional circumstances.
Each of the main arguments for property rights is in fact concerned not just to establish a
set of powers, immunities, claims, and so on, but a security in the arrangements around
private property. Any possibility of submitting landowners’ ownership to a generalized
multifactorial analysis to determine whether it may continue is to disrupt this security,
thus giving rise to a prima facie case against a remedial approach relying on removing
land from private landowners. Such a remedial approach would effectively impose a
burden of insecurity against every private landowner in any place where there is the
possibility of an Aboriginal title claim arising (and this includes, for instance, most of the
province of British Columbia). There are inherent reasons to protect the current
ownership and to compensate in some other way for wrongs of the past. Whether any of
these wrongs have been wholly superseded is a different question on which Waldron’s
argument may raise further questions, but the remedy of taking back privately held lands
is in any case superseded by the relationship of present landowners to their land.
This claim fits within a broader argument of where bright-line rules are more appropriate
than multifactorial tests. [...]
That said, there may be rare exceptions to this general proposition. Where a current
landowner was actually actively complicit in fraud or other wrongs, there may be good
reasons to contemplate the option of a remedy that removes the specific landowner’s
unjust enrichment. Where there is a particular reason why specific lands are especially
important to an Aboriginal community, the possibility of expropriating those lands from
the current landowner, with compensation, may also become appropriate, based on the
normal set of moral factors applicable to expropriation. But to set up something other
than a bright-line rule protecting current ownership against Aboriginal title claims is
already to cause harm. It is that harm that Justice Vickers’s reawakening of a prospect of
new dispossessions awakens, and it is that harm that the Aboriginal title doctrine should
resist.
In one sense, this puts a narrow point related to a very specific clash of Aboriginal title
and private property. In another, however, it provides an illustration of a possible
application of the supersession of historic injustices. In so doing, it raises the potentially
controversial prospect that Waldron’s account of supersession has more to be said for it
than it first appears. Though Waldron’s account has little to be said for it at an abstract
level oriented to broad societal factors, it may have applications to more concrete
problems, and it is necessary to analyze matters on a case-by-case basis in relation to this
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possibility. Attempting to unravel an apparently isolated problem has thus exposed
possibly broader implications for substantially different scenarios, manifesting the need
for ongoing and urgent theoretical attention to related matters.

